Reflections on the SAF, Club Loyalty, and the Future of Major Teams

At the end of 2023, a year in which some relevant SAF (Sociedade Anônima do Futebol - Football Limited Company) projects were beginning to take off, analysts claimed that the model had failed, mainly due to the results of three of them: Botafogo, Cruzeiro, and Bahia.

This position was immediately rejected in this space, and the justifications seemed obvious: although Botafogo SAF led for most of the championship, the 5th position, for a team that, two years earlier, was in Série B, signaled a prospect of relevant structural change; Meanwhile, the proposal from Cruzeiro's SAF shareholders anticipated a difficult year after promotion from Série B to Série A, but already projected improvement for the following year, consisting of participation in a cup final and better performance in Série A. Bahia SAF, with its powerful controlling shareholder, who spoke little – and still speaks little – and received senseless criticism (for almost relegating the team, a position it held, incidentally, in 2022), was going through a process of understanding and adapting to the Brazilian environment, which would soon be reversed.

In 2024, Botafogo SAF achieved improbable milestones in such a short time, winning the Brazilian championship and the most important title in its history, the Copa Libertadores. Cruzeiro's SAF reached 9th place in Série A and returned to an international final, in the Copa Sudamericana. And Bahia SAF rediscovered the same Libertadores after a 35-year absence.

In 2025, Cruzeiro's SAF (Sociedade Anônima do Futebol - Football Corporation) reached third place in the final standings. Botafogo SAF, with 5th place, secured its third consecutive participation in the Copa Libertadores, and Bahia SAF, for the first time in its history, will compete in this competition twice in a row.

The three SAFs have had distinct experiences throughout their short journeys so far.

Botafogo SAF, after extreme media exposure of its controlling shareholder and controversial business and sporting moves, became involved in a transnational legal battle. Cruzeiro's SAF changed hands and came to be controlled and managed by an emblematic businessman and fan, who has the resources and cash flow to invest, reinvest, take risks, correct course, and aim for grand goals. Bahia SAF, finally, seems to operate with a stable model like no other, capable of projecting movements and results and, who knows, surprising the country with ambitions far greater than one might imagine.

The novelty in the SAF (Sociedade Anônima do Futebol - Football Corporation) environment, according to press reports¹, may be the Fluminense project, already discussed in this space², whose unique characteristics will enable it to reach the highest levels in the national and Latin American hierarchy. In addition, there is the resurgence of Athletico Paranaense, a team that should never have been relegated, and which should return stronger and, according to press reports, tends to move towards the formation of a special SAF as well, due to the solidity of its patrimonial and financial structure.

These teams should join, if the projects are confirmed, the SAF of Atlético Mineiro, which is going through an economic crisis but will find, with the support of its controllers, a planned way out of its challenges; the SAF of Vasco, also in crisis, but which may also take off when it resolves its legal and corporate entanglements; and the SAF of Coritiba, which will be tested in 2026 as a result of the pioneering efforts of a "Faria Lima" fund. And to the only corporate-owned club in Série A, Red Bull Bragantino, which faces a peculiar situation: excellent infrastructure, players' salaries paid on time, located in a city that offers a good quality of life, but which still seems to struggle against a possible complacency resulting from the absence of fans and external pressure for results.

In the short term, betting on the implementation of some SAFs (Sociedades Anônimas de Futebol - Football Corporations) and the stabilization of others – which will undoubtedly experience setbacks in their trajectories, but with better conditions to face obstacles – how can the other traditional teams in crisis, with large fan bases, that insist on the associative model, compete with capitalized, well-managed SAFs, without political conflicts and stable in terms of corporate and organizational structure?

Not to mention the difficulty – or near impossibility – of competing with the two clubs that, in the recent past, have distanced themselves from the others, including the SAFs (Sociedades Anônimas de Futebol – Football Corporations): Flamengo and Palmeiras.

São Paulo, Corinthians, Santos, Grêmio, and Internacional find themselves, therefore, at a historic, almost fatal crossroads. They all survived until 2025, but for how long will they be able to sustain themselves, thanks to their fan bases and past glories, with impractical debts and inefficiencies inherent to club politics?

There is no longer time, given the characteristics of the football market, for parsimonious rescues like Flamengo's – which, in this case, began at the start of the last decade – to occur. The dynamism of relationships and the evolution of the protagonists' revenues, which progress geometrically, do not respect the arithmetic evolution of the associations, subjected to degenerative policies.

Even so, no one should be surprised if some manager of a major club in crisis looks at Mirassol and points to it as proof that there is still salvation in club loyalty.