Regarding the Taxation of Sports Clubs and the Impact of Tax Reform on the Football Corporation
In the previous column, after a brief exposition regarding the tax scenario for SAFs – public limited companies in football and football clubs organized as non-profit associations – a scenario resulting from the tax reform whose debate began at the dawn of Lula's government and concluded in 2026 – the following questions remained for future answers:
What will be the importance of associativism, and not of one club or another, in (and for) civil society?
Based on the answer, should society mobilize the public machinery to promote a new constitutional reform and grant non-profit associations – which, with few exceptions, have generated billions in social liabilities, despite centuries-old privileges at the taxpayer's expense – the prerogatives of a specific tax regime?
The new debate, while legitimate, is untimely. This does not mean that it cannot be revisited or, more appropriately, initiated. Even though the country has been subjected to waves of criticism and defense of the tax reform, with some sectors indignant and others exultant, associativism, as a body or even in isolation, as a result of singular discontent, seems not to have emerged.
Now, any eventual solution to the situation, which would need to be justified with technical arguments, would necessarily imply a constitutional amendment – with all the inherent complexity – due to the provision of Article 156-A, § 6, IV of the Federal Constitution (which refers only to SAF):
“156-A. A supplementary law shall establish a tax on goods and services of shared competence between States, the Federal District and Municipalities. (...)
§ 6. A supplementary law shall provide for specific taxation regimes for: (...)
IV - hotel services, amusement parks and theme parks, travel and tourism agencies, bars and restaurants, sporting activity developed by a Public Limited Football Company and regional aviation, and may provide for hypotheses of changes in the rates, in the calculation bases and in the rules of crediting, admitting the non-application of the provisions of § 1, V to VIII;
(...)” (emphasis added).
Moving on, then, to a possible attempt at constitutional reform, a relevant aspect should also guide the (imagined) new debate: would the collective effort benefit any and all sports clubs, or only clubs that are not primarily and predominantly involved in professional sports activities, especially football?
Here, then, is the point: the controversy originates from the dissatisfaction of football clubs, which for over a century have benefited from tax regimes at the expense of the community, with the fact that, at the end of the reform, the SAF (Sociedade Anônima do Futebol - Football Corporation) will be subject to a different regime (which is, it should be emphasized, much more severe than that originally foreseen in the SAF Law, which not only created the SAF but, more importantly, introduced a model, including a tax model, that, less than five years after its introduction, and no more than a century later, was modified, subverting the rules of the game right after its beginning).
Should it then be appropriate to treat clubs dedicated to Olympic activities, which are not organized, voluntarily or involuntarily, as companies, differently from the large and powerful clubs, whether profitable or not, that handle amounts exceeding those of thousands of companies, taxpayers, and, in some cases, greater than all the SAFs?
The solution might be found with the support of comparative systems, such as the French one. Article L.122-1 of the Sports Code establishes that (according to a free translation) “every sports association affiliated with a sports federation, which habitually participates in the organization of a paid sporting event, which obtains (lui procurent) revenues exceeding a level set by decree of the Council of State or which employs athletes whose remuneration exceeds a value set by the Council of State, constitutes, for the management of its activities, a commercial company subject to the commercial code”.
Bringing and adapting the solution to Brazil, and also with the purpose of addressing the possible need to revive Olympic activities, a potential reform could benefit clubs that do not prioritize professional sports as their primary activity – verifiable by the origin of their revenues.
This solution, analyzed in depth, would resolve, with one more tactical move, the Olympic and professional needs: through the creation of a SAF (Sociedade Anônima do Futebol - Football Limited Company), wholly owned by the club itself, and whose revenue segregated from the SAF would be mostly or entirely reinvested in the football team itself.
With this reform, therefore, Olympic sports and professional football would become formally autonomous, but would remain directly or indirectly subject to the same center of power, consisting of the elected administration of the club.
The club, moreover, as an autonomous entity, would be subject to a tax structure, in theory, reformed to stimulate Olympic sports, and the SAF (Sociedade Anônima do Futebol - Football Corporation), belonging to the club itself, without national or international investors, would have the same tax burden as any other SAF.
It remains to be seen whether there will be immediate political space (or interest) to address the issue, and whether there will be consensus on the model, which, it seems, should prioritize Olympic sports.
In short: little is said about the impact of the reform on the SAF, which operates under a regime that has not yet completed five years and has already been severely altered.
The SAF law, approved in 2021, provides for the unified monthly collection of various taxes, including PIS and Cofins, for a period of five years, at a rate of 5% on monthly revenue (and not on profit), with a reduced tax base, and, from the sixth year onwards, at a rate of 4%, with an expanded base.
With the regulation of the tax reform by LC 214/25, article 293 set the rate at 4% for federal taxes (IRPJ, CSLL and certain contributions), 1.5% for CBS and 3% for IBS, which raised the total burden to 8.5%, on the expanded base. Therefore, an increase of over 100%.
However, LC 227/26 modified the final rate again. The federal tax rate remained at 4%, while the CBS and IBS taxes were reduced to 1%, resulting in a 6% tax rate with an expanded base. In other words, the original tax burden increased from 4% to 6%, representing a 50% increase.
Almost no one has spoken or written about this so far.
